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IN THE SUPREHE COURT OF THE
STJ\TE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

Case No. 15573

-vsSTEVEN J. LAURSEN,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with t\o.ro counts of automobile
homicide, a felony of the third degree, in violation of Utah
Code Ann.

§

76-5-207 (1)

(Supp. 1977).

DISPOSITION IN THE LOHER COURT
The jury returned a verdict of guilty on both
counts, and the Honorable J. Robert Bullock sentenced the
defendant to a term of not less than five years in the Utah
State Prison on both counts; the terms are to run concurrently.
RELlER SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an order of this Court affirming the judgment rendered below.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
On July 27, 1977, the defendant caused the death
of Ronald Beck and Michael Hansen by driving a truck into
their motorcycle (T.6,25).

The defendant and Robert Greenwood,

a passenger in defendant's truck, left the scene of the
accident (T.lO).

The defendant was taken to his parent's

home by David Jones (T.lO).

Later that evening, the defen-

dant went to a hospital in American Fork to be treated for
his injuries, and took a blood/alcohol test at that
time at police request (T.35-37).

The defendant's blood

contained 0.15% alcohol (T.73).
The defendant admitted that he had been the driver
of the vehicle that struck and killed the two victims(T.38).
The single important factural issue at trial was whether
defendant was intoxicated at the time of the accident.
The record on appeal contains only a partial transcript of the trial and omits the testimony of Officer Gary N.
Johnson, Richard Blomquist (the driver of the vehicle that
defendant was attempting to pass at the time the accident
occurred) and Margaret Morrell (the nurse that drew defendant's
blood for testing)

(R.33-37).

The jury apparently felt that

Mr. Blomquist's testimony as to the defendant's driving pattern was important on the question of guilt (R.42).
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The available transcript reveals the following
evidence on the issue of intoxication:

Robert Greenwood

testified that the defendant had been drinking the day of
the accident from a keg containing one to two gallons of
bear (T.3-4).

The defendant did not drink anything after

the accident while being driven home (T.l3,18).

Officer Bob

Greenhalgh testified that the defendant was given a blood
alcohol test at 11:30 p.m. and that the accident had occurred
at approximately 9:15p.m.

(T.35-38).

The officer also took

the defendant's statement that he had been drinking beer
prior to the accident, that he had taken his last drink at
about 7:00p.m., that he had nothing to drink after the
accident, and that he could remember nothing that happened
after the accident (T.38).

Officer Jay Schoonover stated

that his opinion was that the defendant was intoxicated at
the time of his arrest (T.58).

Dr. Albert Swenson testified

that the defendant's blood contained 0.15% alcohol (T.73).
This percentage is equal to the amount of alcohol in eight
twelve ounce cans of beer (T.76).

The witness testified

that if the defendant had taken his last drink at 7:00p.m.,
his blood/alcohol level at the time of the accident would
have been about 0.19% (T.78).

The witness also testified,

on cross-examination, that if the defendant had taken his
last drink after the time of the accident, his blood/alcohol

-3-
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level at 11:30 p.m. would be irrelevant to his blood/
alcohol level at the time of the accident (T.79).

The

defendant made timely objection to the introduction of the
blood/alcohol test results on the ground that an insufficient
foundation had been laid, because there was no showing that
defendant had not drunk alcohol after the accident (T.54-56).
The court overruled the objection but did not instruct the
jury that there was any presumption as to the time of the
defendant's last drink (T.56-57).

The record reveals no

objection to any instruction given the jury, nor does the
record reveal an objection to the court sentencing the defendant on both counts of the information.
ARGUHENT
POINT I
THE COURT BELOW PROPERLY ADMITTED EVIDENCE OF
THE DEFENDANT'S BLOOD/ALCOHOL LEVEL.
The results of a test to determine blood/alcohol
content is admissible in an automobile homicide action when
it is material to prove that a person was driving under the
influence of of alcohol, Utah Code Ann.
1977).

Utah Code Ann.

§

§

76-5-207(2)

(Supp.

41-6-44.5 (Supp. 1977) provides:

"If the chemical test was not
taken within one hour after the alleged
incident, the evidence of the amount
of alcohol in the person's blood as
shown by the chemical test is admissible
if expert testimony establishes 1ts
probative value . .
-4- by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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In this case, expert testimony did establish the probative
value of the blood test, because the expert testified that
he could calculate the defendant's blood/alcohol level at
the time of the accident from the test results if the
defendant took his last drink before the accident.

This

evidence was relevant, probative and properly admitted
because other evidence raised a jury question as to the
defendant's intoxication at the time of the accident.

In

this case, the jury heard evidence of the defendant's driving pattern, defendant's drinking during the day of the
accident, and defendant's somewhat contradictory statement
that he had nothing to drink after the accident and that he
remembered nothing that happened after the accident.

There

was also evidence that defendant left the scene of the
accident and was belligerent at the time of his arrest.

This

evidence raises a jury question of intoxication at the time
of the accident, and made evidence of the blood/alcohol test
relevant and admissible.
The courts of several jurisdictions have dealt with
this issue and have resolved it adversely to the defendant.
In State v. Betts, 214 Kan. 271, 519 P.2d 655 (1974), the court
held that evidence of a defendant's intoxication almost three
hours after an accident was admissible where there was evidence
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of an erratic driving pattern at the time of the accident,
evidence that the defendant left the scene of the crime,
and evidence that defendant was belligerent at the time of
his arrest.

The case of State v. Hansen, 206 N.W.2d 352

(Minn 1973) presents a striking parallel to the present case.
In Hansen, there was a three hour interval between the accident
and the test that showed defendant had a blood/alcohol level
of 0.11%.

The defendant challenged the admission of the test

results into evidence because
" • . . the prosecution failed to
show the defendant had not consumed
any alcoholic beverage in the three
hour interval between the driving
conduct resulting in death and the
extraction of the blood sample."
Hansen at 355.
The court concluded
" . . . that the circumstances,
including flight, justify the inference that defendant had not
consumed alcohol during the three
hour period." Id.
The court came to the conclusion even though the
I

"eyewitness accounts as to
defendant's condition as syptomatic
of alcoholic intake at the time of
the . . . collision are ambiguous and
conflicting." Id. at 354-355
In the following cases, courts have rejected a defendant's
contention that blood/alcohol test evidence is inadmissible
unless the prosecution can demonstrate that the defendant
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the last drink was taken after the accident.

Defendant's

counsel was free to argue, and the jury was free to find,
that there was a reasonable doubt that the test reflected
alcohol consumed prior to the accident.

On the evidence out-

lined above, the jury did not make that finding.

Respondent

submits that the blood/alcohol evidence was properly admitted
and defendant's conviction should be affirmed.
POINT II
THE COURT BELOW PROPERLY SENTENCED THE DEFENDANT
ON BOTH COUNTS OF THE INFORMATION.
The record does not contain any indication that
defendant objected to the trial court sentencing him on both
counts.

Respondent submits that this alleged error should

not be heard for the first time on appeal.
27 Utah 2d 416, 497 P.2d 26
Utah Code Ann.

§

State v. Carter,

(1972).
76-1-402(1} {Supp 1977) does not

bar sentencing on both counts because it applies only when
the same act of the defendant is punishable in different
ways under different provisions of the code.
defendant's two different acts

In this case,

(ie. causing the death of

Ronald Beck and causing the death of Michael Hansen) are
punishable under the

~

provision of the criminal code.

The cases cited by the defendant for the proposition that it is improper to sentence on both counts are
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distinguishable.

Contrary to defendant's assertion, the

facts of Dawson v. State, 266 So.2d 116 (Fla. 1972) do not
indicate that the defendant was charged with causing the
death of two passengers riding in the same car.

As the

court citation to Stewart v. State, 184 So.2d 489 (Fla.
App. 1966) makes clear, an anomaly in Florida criminal
procedure allows a defendant to be found guilty on two
counts of manslaughter even if only one victim is involved.
In Virgil v. State, 563 P.2d 1349 (1977) the trial court
imposed only one sentence, and the Wyoming Supreme Court
affirmed, but noted:
"There are many cases holding
that killing by culpable negligence
several human beings in one automobile accident constitutes as
many separate offenses as there
are victims and consecutive sentences are proper." Virgil at 1352
In State v. Little, 19 Utah 2d 53, 426 P.2d 4 (1967) this
court held that it was improper to impose two sentences under
two separate provisions of the criminal code for one act.
This rule does not apply to this case for the reasons discussed above.

People v. Duran, 515 P.2d 1117 (Colo. 1973)

dealt only with the imposition of consecutive .punishments,
not concurrent sentences as were imposed in this case.

The

California rule, demonstrated in People v. McFarland, 26
Cal. Rptr. 473, 376 P.2d 449 (1962), that two sentences can-
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I

I

not be imposed for a burglary and a larceny is clearly in
conflict with the Utah rule State v. Jones, 13 Utah 2d 35,
363 P.2d 262 (1962).

In Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S.

I
I

II

169 (1958) the court did hold that a single shotgun blast
f

wounding two federal officers constituted only a single

I

offense.

I

The persuasive value of Ladner is lessened by the

fact that it dealt purely with an issue of congressional
intent and not of constitutional law.
stitutional issue presented."

"There is no con-

Ladner at 173.

Further,

Ladner involved the imposition of consecutive sentence, a
problem not present in this case.
Respondent submits that causing two people to die
is more culpable than causing one to die, and that defendant's
two concurrent sentences are fair and appropriate punishments.
CONCLUSIONS
Based on the foregoing, respondent submits that
defendant's conviction should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSON
Attorney General
HICHAEL L. DEAMER
Deputy Attorney General
WILLIAH W. BARRETT
Assistant Attorney General
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